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Paradigms, Hybrids, and a “Third Way” 
 
 
Abstract 
This study explores how public sector reform discourses are reflected in Russian central 
government budgeting. Through the lenses of institutional logics, Russian central government 
budgeting is considered to be a social institution that is influenced by rivaling reform 
paradigms: Public Administration, New Public Management, the Neo-Weberian State, and New 
Public Governance. Although NPM has dominated the agenda during the last decade, all four 
have been presented in ‘talks’ and ‘decisions’ regarding government budgeting. The empirical 
evidence illustrates that the implementation of management accounting techniques in the 
Russian public sector has coincided with and contradicted the construction of the Russian 
version of bureaucratic governance, which is referred to as the vertical of power. Having been 
accompanied by participatory mechanisms and a re-evaluation of the Soviet legacy, the reforms 
have created prerequisites for various outcomes at the level of budgeting practices: conflicts, as 
in the UK, and hybridization, as in Finland. 
  
 
Keywords: Russia, public sector reforms, government budgeting, New Public Management, 
Institutional Logics, hybrids.  
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1. Introduction 
The public sector is a significant component of global and national economies, and contributes 
to approximately 30 percent of the world’s gross domestic product in terms of expenditures, 
ranging from 11 to 51 percent in national economies (Bandy, 2011). Until the end of the 1970s, 
Max Weber’s (1922) ideas regarding rational bureaucracy served as the theoretical foundation 
for managing public expenditures and providing public services (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). 
Weber’s ideas included, but were not limited to, detaching public administration from the 
political agenda while seeking for a good or right behavior of public sector administrators in 
performing their tasks (initially formulated in Wilson, 1887). During the last four decades or so, 
we have witnessed substantial efforts to reinvent public sectors worldwide. New Public 
Management (NPM), which represents a comprehensive body of ideas (Hood, 1991), variations 
of a theme (Hood, 1995), or a cluster of reforms, has been on the top of the agenda for public 
administration in the Western countries (Hood, 1991; OECD, 1995). This development 
represents a paradigm shift from the traditional bureaucratic model that was invented by 
Weber towards a management model and is increasingly considered to be a global trend (see, 
e.g., Sahlin-Andersson, 2001). Weber’s ideas provide for the efficient execution of legal 
authority and power, while NPM represents the efficient management of public resources in a 
more businesslike manner in the context of a newly defined role of state operations (Budäus 
and Buchholtz, 1996; Naschold, 1995; Eliassen and Kooimann, 1993). Arguments for NPM 
reforms include a more efficient and effective use of resources, augmented accountability, a 
greater focus on outputs, and improved performance, to name just a few (Hood, 1991, 1995; 
Mellet, 2002).  
The United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia served as the earliest examples for the 
emergence of NPM on the edge of the 1970s and 1980s (Hood, 1991). Continental Europe and 
developing countries began incorporating NPM in the 1980s (Hood, 1995). Further on, Anglo-
Saxon community has intensively promoted NPM reforms to less-developed economies (see, 
e.g., IMF, 2006 for Malaysia; Timoshenko and Adhikari, 2010 for Nepal; Kuruppu, 2010 for Sri 
Lanka and numerous others) through international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). However, certain reforms under the NPM 
umbrella have not been enacted in the pure sense in certain contexts, including European 
continental countries. This lack of enactment has coincided with the emergence of various 
discourses regarding public sector reform paradigms other than NPM, including Public 
Administration (PA), New Public Governance (NPG) and the Neo-Weberian State (NWS) (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2011). Conversely, Drechsler (2013) offers a different perspective and presents 
a contextual paradigm of governance and administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic 
traditions of governance. The homogeneity of these traditions is widely questioned. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2011) suggest that the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European traditions differ, 
and Pollitt (2009) declares that the Russian or Soviet tradition is a stand-alone case and claims 
that post-Soviet Eastern European countries share many common features with the Russian 
model. In the Russian case, which is apparently similar to numerous post-Communist contexts, 
the ideas of NPM were apparently not based on the business practices, but rather were 
Page 2 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
3 
 
imported by the international financial institutions (Timoshenko, 2008; Timoshenko & Adhikari, 
2009, 2010). However, unlike numerous developing economies, Russia inherited its accounting 
tradition (Bourmistrov, 2001) and the legacy of a sophisticated administrative planning system 
that was used to govern the state, the public sector and so-called socialist enterprises in the 
Soviet Union.  
At the outset of the 2000s, a wind of NPM-driven reforms swept through the Russian public 
sector landscape at an accelerated pace (see Timoshenko, 2006, 2008; Timoshenko and 
Adhikari, 2009, 2010; Bourmistrov, 2006). Numerous ambitious top-down government 
initiatives signaled a clear-cut shift in the ideology that was imbued in the Russian public 
administration. The policy reforms included, but were not limited to, the structural reform of 
government agencies and other reforms of all federal relations and self-government, the launch 
and implementation of performance-oriented budgeting and medium-term financial planning, 
as well as a stride away from traditional cash accounting toward business-like accrual 
accounting. Prior empirical studies in the context of Russia have revealed that, at the beginning 
of the millennium, Russian decision-makers were markedly influenced by overseas 
developments, particularly, large international organizations such as the IMF and the WB. It is 
indeed through these supranational agencies that budgeting and accounting ideas commonly 
propagated in the West arrived on Russian shores. Although these concepts originated in a 
rather normative manner from international organizations, they were coercively diffused by 
government officials throughout Russia, which caused considerable hardships for a myriad of 
public sector entities. This resulted in the external image of the Russian state as an NPM 
reformer being decoupled from the local practice, implying the existence of a rhetoric-reality 
gap. Therefore, rather than being instrumental, these seemingly NPM-like alterations were 
better comprehended in terms of legitimacy (Timoshenko, 2006, 2008; Timoshenko and 
Adhikari, 2009). 
In their study of governmental accounting, Antipova and Bourmistrov (2011) have claimed that, 
although on-going changes seemingly fit well with the Russian top political agenda, they have 
contradicted existing accounting traditions. In the aftermath of this, a hybrid accounting system 
has come into being, which “combines historical “sediments” of the past and only some 
“innovations” of today” (Antipova and Bourmistrov, 2011, p. 10). This clearly aligns with prior 
empirical studies regarding public sectors worldwide, which indicate that NPM-inspired reforms 
are better understood in terms of fashionable and popular line of thought, rather than a full-
fledged device calibrated to solve all public administration problems. Having said that, those 
actions by Russian officials may have intended to bolster a favorable image of the state in the 
eyes of external parties such as foreign investors and supra-national institutions, such as the 
IMF and the WB. Neo-institutional theorists could argue that this is an anticipated situation 
providing that such changes are viewed as going from the top and seen as an adaptation to the 
environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). However, bearing in mind 
the presence of strong Russian traditions (Bourmistrov, 2001; Antipova and Bourmistrov, 2011, 
2013), there could also be enough space for competing paradigms. As suggested by Wiesel and 
Modell (2014), these paradigms may be seen as governance logics.  
Page 3 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
4 
 
Notably, with certain minor exceptions, a current body of research on recent developments in 
the Russian public sector is still in short supply. Although developments in Russian central and 
local government accounting have been studied by Western researchers (e.g. Bourmistrov, 
2001; Timoshenko, 2006), there is a conscious absence of rigorous research efforts regarding 
the current Russian government budgeting system in Western studies that are written in the 
English language. Concurrently, scholars have acknowledged the crucial importance of studying 
management accounting in governments, including the implications for the implementation of 
public sector reforms (Lapsley, 2000, 2001; Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006). In the case of Russia, 
the introduction of management accounting with its calculative nature into the central 
government context, where planning and forecasting have a long-lasting tradition (and 
potentially play a more significant role than politics), may result in other unintended 
consequences that differ from liberal market economies. Furthermore, virtually nothing has 
been unleashed about Russian central government budgeting in most of international 
accounting and budgeting research networks, workshops, and groups. This paucity of rigorous 
research efforts on the topic is a valuable source of motivation to augment the knowledge 
regarding Russian governmental budgeting, both in terms of theoretical development and 
empirical knowledge. 
Based on the above discussion, this study seeks to explore which logics (paradigms and 
discourses) have prevailed in the Russian public sector over time and how these discourses 
have been reflected on in Russian central government budgeting. This paper relies on the 
Pollitt’s (2009) assertion that the Russian case is heterogeneous from both developed and 
developing countries because of the absence of democratic public administration tradition and 
the existence of Soviet administrative planning traditions. The purpose of the study is to 
identify a potentially new configuration, the so-called “third way” of how NPM-like public 
sector reforms may be instituted in a complex, fast-changing and unexplored context. A time 
span for the research covers a period commencing from the beginning of the 2000s and 
continuing until 2015, with the most significant government initiatives discussed. Aligning with 
Scandinavian institutionalists (Bergevärn et al., 1995), a distinction is made between the world 
of norms and the world of actions in this paper. The authors of this study base their analysis on 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) and assume that ‘talks’ and ‘decisions’ in public sector reform 
discourses may constitute norms. Therefore, the paper focuses on budgeting provisions 
appeared during the last decade or so at the macro-level and does, therefore, have limitations 
with regard to scope. Hopefully, this study’s findings may inspire future research regarding how 
scholars interpret the outcomes of public sector reforms in non-Western contexts. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section offers an overview of public 
sector reform paradigms that have recently emerged. A theoretical framework is then 
elaborated on, where the governmental budget is considered to be a social construction. The 
theoretical lenses include neo-institutional theory and its recent incarnation, which is referred 
to as the institutional logics approach. Section 4 provides a more contextual understanding of 
broad public sector reforms in Russia and recent alterations in Russian governmental budgeting 
that were brought about by the federal government. In the penultimate section, the viewing of 
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budgeting as a social institution is utilized in attempts to gain a clearer understanding of what 
eventually affected the thinking round Russian government budgeting to change the reform 
path. Section 6 presents the study’s conclusions and proposals for future research. 
 
2. Public Sector Reforms Discourses  
Along with numerous accomplishments, NPM has received significant criticism from the 
academic and professional communities (see, e.g., Lapsley, 2008, Drechsler and Kattel, 2008). 
For example, more than two decades ago, Brunsson and Olsen (1993) documented that, 
generally, this criticism occurred because public sector reforms rarely proceed as expected, or 
intended by the policymakers that designed the reforms. Notably, the existing patterns of 
successful implementation of public sector reforms are often advocated by authors that are 
closely affiliated with international financial institutions such as the IMF (Dabla-Norris et al., 
2010), the WB, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Ruffner and 
Sevilla, 2004, Webber, 2004). Concurrently, academic researchers have unveiled a huge gap 
between the ideal reform concepts and the application of new financial instruments (e.g. Ter 
Bogt and Van Helden, 2000). The resilience of traditional public sector financial instruments in 
certain leading Western economies has important implications for the reform process (Jones et 
al., 2013). Vivid examples of NPM-like reforms that have a national “flavor” include the “New 
Zealand model”, the Canadian and Belgian models, and the German model (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011).  
Furthermore, new trends have been recently emerged in the literature, threatening to 
challenge the ideological leadership of NPM in the field of public sector reforms and even to 
dismiss or supersede it. As Pollitt (2009) noted, traditional bureaucracy excels post-bureaucratic 
forms of organization in terms of organizational memory and the capability to learn from 
experience. In turn, Drechsler (2013) introduced three potential paradigms of governance and 
administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic. He accentuated the significance of national 
(regional) contexts in public sector developments, and promoted the use of a contextual 
approach to study public sector reforms. Lastly, as evidenced by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), 
numerous national and regional models have been established by distinguishing themselves 
from the Anglo-Saxon model (e.g. Nordic model in Veggeland, 2007), which implies that the 
most significant changes regarding NPM have been achieved in Anglophone countries. 
The results of prior studies regarding NPM are somewhat contradictory and riddled with 
controversies; a growing number of empirical studies clearly speak against it. These studies 
provide more evidence of endeavors to modernize the public sector landscape worldwide 
rather than to achieve desired outcomes. In their recent studies of a thirty-year period of public 
management makeovers in the UK, Hood and Dixon (2015, 2016) documented the failure of 
reforms to reduce government costs and improve its ability to serve the citizenry. However, 
despite the above criticism of NPM and its documented merits, there is a consensus in the 
literature that NPM is still alive and very much kicking, and will continually stay attractive to 
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policymakers, at least in the foreseeable future, and challenge public sector managers even as 
it faces resistance and opposition from the profession (see, e.g., Lapsley, 2008; Hyndman and 
Lapsley, 2016). Recent studies regarding NPM may be channeled into two streams. One stream 
strengthens the trend of government reduction while focusing broadly on inter-organizational 
settings. This is what has become known as NPG (Osborne, 2010). The other stream has 
proposed a model that partially reinvents the merits of a historical ancestor of NPM – PA. This 
is often referred to as the NWS (Drechsler and Kattel, 2008; Lynn, 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011). Furthermore, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) affirm the existence of three recently 
emerged models of public sector reforms: NPM, the NWS, and NPG. However, certain other 
scholars are of the view that we are experiencing a paradigmatic gap and a pronounced public 
sector model is not currently available. As Coen and Roberts (2012) stated, “the critical point 
today is not that one paradigm has been replaced by another. Rather, it is that – for the time 
being – there is no dominant paradigm at all” (p. 8-9). 
 
3. Understanding Public Sector Reforms Using Institutional Logics through Studying 
Government Budgeting Norms 
Public sector reforms and developments in government budgeting are often interpreted by 
relying on Institutional Theory (e.g. Czarniawska-Joerges and Jacobsson, 1989; Brunsson, 1993). 
Institutional Theory (IT) has been a dominating approach that is used by the Western research 
community to describe organizational changes in social sciences for the past 50 years. As noted 
by Czarniawska (2008), “institutional theory is not a theory at all, but a framework, a 
vocabulary, a way of thinking about social life, which may take many paths” (Czarniawska, 
2008, p. 770). IT focuses attention on the relationships within and among organizations. Some 
of the most well-known aspects of these relationships lead to the categories of organizational 
structure as a myth and ceremony (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and isomorphism of three types – 
normative, coercive and mimetic (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Over time, IT has not been static, but constantly develops and creates streams and discourses 
within itself, enlightening the diverse aspects of institutions and the process of 
institutionalization. Certain scholars (e.g., Zilber, 2013) tend to channel most recent 
developments into two streams: institutional work and institutional logic. Institutional logics 
authors position themselves as successors of new institutionalists, sharing with Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) a concern with how cultural rules and cognitive 
structures shape organizational structures. However, their main focus is not on the 
isomorphism, “but on the effects of differentiated institutional logics on individuals and 
organizations in a larger variety of contexts, including markets, industries, and populations of 
organizational forms” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p. 100). Institutional logics are defined as 
“the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, 
and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time 
and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). 
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In the context of the public sector, the implied sources of the reforms may be derived from the 
classic troika of the types of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or the set of seven 
institutional orders (Thornton et al., 2012). Thus, the market logic may contradict state logic, 
and management logic may oppose the governance logic. In addition, these competing logics 
may be suggested by the previous review of reform paradigms; when NPM managers oust 
Public Administration bureaucrats, one may infer that the logic of profession is challenged by 
business logic. Therefore, in the context of the Russian central government, NPM logic may 
confront other logics that are referenced in public sector reform discourses, such as PA, NPG or 
the NWS. 
Regardless of the context and reform discourse, the budget is the foundation of the public 
sector. For the public sector, the budget plays a role similar to the role of accounting in a 
private sector, and performs the primary functions that are assigned to accounting, such as 
supporting legitimacy and exerting control (Mellemvik et al., 1988; Gårseth-Nesbakk and 
Timoshenko, 2014). Accounting is often perceived as socially constituted or socially constructed, 
which implies that the computational practices and techniques of accounting are “intrinsically 
and irredeemably social” (Miller, 1994; p. 4). Having originated from institutional theory in 
general and the legitimation concept, in particular, this perspective tends to define the 
phenomenon being researched as: “… a set of practices that affects the type of world we live in, 
the type of social reality we inhabit, the way in which we understand the choices open to 
business undertakings and individuals, the way in which we manage and organize activities and 
processes of diverse types, and the way in which we administer the lives of others and 
ourselves” (Miller, 1994, p. 1). 
In this article, an understanding of budget as a social institution is elaborated on. A social 
institution is broadly defined as “an (observable) pattern of collective action (social practice), 
justified by a corresponding norm” (Czarniawska, 1997 in Czarniawska, 2009, p. 423). Although 
the primary focus of this definition is on social life and social practices, this study is primarily 
concerned with the concept of norm. The comprehension of a norm departs from the 
perception of accounting, which is a system of norms and a system of actions (Bergevärn et al., 
1995). In their comparative and historical study of Swedish and Norwegian municipal 
accounting, Bergevärn et al. (1995) suggest discerning between the accounting action system 
and the accounting norm system. The former envisages a purely technical domain, and 
embodies those computational practices and instrumental activities designed to register, 
measure, and communicate economic data for an economic unit (Mellemvik and Olson, 1996). 
In turn, the accounting norm system consists of the institutional environment of the accounting 
action system (Bergevärn et al., 1995), and tends to be formed and shaped via complex 
interactions between various stakeholders involved in the process of regulation (Mezias, 1990; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). By wishing their interests to be represented, diverse groups of 
stakeholders participate in the process of norm setting to promote their own version of an 
organization’s reality to be legitimized. The resulting norm system may therefore vary from the 
intentions, even though accounting action may utterly be controlled by the norms (Bergevärn 
et al., 1995). That being said, the norm system of Russian central government budgeting is dealt 
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with in this paper, leaving budgeting action for further research. Since the authors of this paper 
are more interested in understanding a social rather than a technical dimension of the 
phenomenon, the institutional nature of a budget is assumed to be similar to that of accounting 
which in turn allows the use of accounting theories and concepts in this paper. 
A norm system is "characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which 
individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy from the 
environment" (Scott and Meyer, 1983, p. 140 in Bergevärn et al., 1995, p. 27). Hence, a system 
of norms forms the institutional environment for the system of actions and is supposed to 
regulate the latter. However, a system of norms is likely to be a thing in itself because actors 
[from the system of actions] tend to affect the normative order that they should obey 
(Bergevärn et al., 1995). Therefore, it is vital to examine the system of norms while developing 
a broader picture of a social institution. Although important, it is insufficient to solely study 
norms to embrace and understand the institution as a whole (Bergevärn et al., 1995). As, 
however, has already been stated, due to the limitations of this study, the paper does not focus 
on the system of actions and leaves this topic for further research.  
Specifically, this study focuses on laws, policies, concepts, political statements, prior studies and 
other texts that may be regarded as sufficiently influential to constitute a norm. In alignment 
with the framework that was suggested by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), official documents 
represent “decisions”, while articles that are published in professional and academic journals, 
newspapers, political statements and speeches are ‘talks’. Together, ‘talks’ and ‘decisions’ 
constitite a system of norms for governmental budgeting. In alignment with the strategy that 
was adopted by Hyndman et al. (2014), this documentary analysis considers budget reforms in 
Russia from a wider international context of global reform discourses, e.g. PA, NPM, NPG and 
the NWS. In order to provide additional evidence of various ideas that are presented in the 
discourse of budget reforms in Russia, code words are used. Since the Russian context has been 
explored less than the Austrian, Italian and British contexts, a decision has been made to 
concentrate on the qualitative description of the context and the content of the norms and 
leave the comparative element for future studies.   
Russian accounting and budgeting journals as varied as “Finansy” [Finance], “Byudjet” [Budget] 
and Finansy i Byudjet: Problemy i Resheniya [Finance and Budget: problems and solutions], to 
list just a few, reflect on budget reforms and occasionally serve as a tribune for government 
executives who wish to provide their first-hand personal perspective directly to the 
professional community. Relevant articles on the topic that are authored by top-level 
government executives, are also considered the primary data. Official government documents 
were easily accessible and publicly available on the Internet and in legislation databases and 
included various laws, presidential decrees, cabinet resolutions, concept papers, and ministerial 
orders, which all contributed to a better understanding of the process of budgetary 
development and changes in the Russian public sector. The entire list of documents that were 
utilized to investigate budgeting norms is provided in Appendix 1. During the process of 
collecting and assessing these norms, it was essential to assemble them according to specific 
time periods, their institutional source, and the degree of regulations they specify. 
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4. Russian State and Public Sector Reforms  
4.1. Context of the Russian state 
Throughout the history, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and later, the Russian Federation 
have represented an example of a society that modernizes itself through rapid changes that 
affect the social sphere and is affected by leading ideologies (Bourmistrov, 2001). The role of 
the state in regards to the production of public goods and commodities has changed, although 
it has remained remarkably significant. After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia 
experienced turbulence as it worked to become a full-fledged market economy and democracy. 
Despite a severe and devastating economic recession throughout the 1990s, numerous ideas 
and policy measures aimed at reforming and modernizing Russian society have evolved on the 
political agenda. The relationship between the Russian state and the rest of the economy, as 
well as the rules of the game, had been dramatically altered. An administrative planning system 
was gradually superseded by a competitive market economy, giving rise to a nascent Russian 
private sector. The latter was considered to be a key factor in constructing the foundation for 
subsequent economic growth.  
Russia made important strides towards establishing a robust private sector under Yeltsin’s 
reign, but the development of the government sector appeared to lag far behind. Although the 
economic conditions were significantly altered, public organizations that provide social services 
in such areas as education and health care remained virtually unchanged since the Soviet era 
(see, e.g., Tokarev, 2000; Beliakov et al., 1998; Tragakes and Lessoff, 2003). Since President 
Putin came to the Kremlin in 2000, questions regarding how to modernize Russian public 
administration came to the forefront and heralded the launch of a more or less comprehensive 
policy pattern. During Putin’s first four-year term in office, he was determined to build a strong 
state and use it to solve all Russia’s problems; this is evident in his statement: “For Russians, a 
strong state is not an anomaly… Quite the contrary, [Russians] see it as a source and guarantor 
of order… and the main driving force of any change” (Business Week, 2000) 
Since 2000, the Russian state has significantly strengthened its presence in the national 
economy (IMF, 2013). This process included two dimensions: boosting budget investments into 
the consolidation and growth of state-owned companies and state corporations as well as de-
privatizing key assets in the oil and gas sector by implementing various, and occasionally, highly 
controversial strategies. In 2012, state-owned enterprises produced approximately 50 percent 
of the Russian GDP (OECD, 2013). Because of an increase in oil prices and steady GDP growth, 
Russia’s public sector received better financial support when compared to the 1990s. Total 
public expenditures from federal and regional budgets in 2012 represented approximately 37.5 
percent of Russia’s GDP (data collected from the Russian Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Economic Development web pages, calculations made by authors for 2012). In 2016, 
according to the Report of Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service, the state controlled up to 70 
percent of the country’s GDP (FAS, 2016). 
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Since Putin’s re-election in 2004, reform energies intensified with rapid velocity. In this context, 
appeals for boosting efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability began to be widely heard in 
the country, serving as truths, in the name of which, the Russian state was to be revitalized. 
Driven by a motto to double Russia’s GDP by 2010, a series of initiatives were proposed by 
government officials, signalizing a clear-cut shift in the ideology of Russian public administration 
(Russia Journal, 2004b). The policy package included, but was not confined to, the Budget 
Process Reform, the Administrative Reform and the Restructuring of the Public Network. 
Boosting accountability and widening managerial autonomy in the Russian general government 
sector were at the forefront of these reform efforts. The goal of the Budget Process Reform was 
to ensure the effective allocation and management of government finances for meeting the 
country’s policy priorities and objectives. The policies were diverse and included the launch and 
implementation of performance-oriented budgeting, managers’ responsibility, medium-term 
financial planning, as well as the transformation of Russian public accounts towards accrual 
accounting.  
The need to reform the budget process was deemed extremely important, “especially if viewed 
in the context of the on-going administrative and other reforms of all federal relations and self-
government” (Russia Journal, 2004a; Kommersant, 2004). This included an ambitious plan for 
streamlining budget institutions, and a change in their nature. A radically improved structure of 
the federal government was endorsed with the passage of Presidential Edict # 314 “On the 
System and Structure of Federal Organs of Executive Power” on March 9th, 2004. The initiative 
was intended to “tackle issues such as the different types of government bodies, their 
respective roles, and the overarching accountability / subordination framework” (Parison and 
Evans, 2004, p. 7). In addition to the Budget Process Reform, Diamond (2005, p. 4) referred to 
this initiative as “a most ambitious attempt to fundamentally restructure of the Russian federal 
government apparatus”. In contrast to the previous six types of budget institutions with often 
unclear internal and external accountabilities (see, e.g., Parison and Evans, 2004), the 2004 
three-tiered shape of the Russian executive branch relied on the principle that ministries would 
have strategic responsibilities and draft legislation. In turn, these agencies would ensure the 
applicability/implementation of legal and regulatory acts, organize the provision of government 
services, and management of state property, while services would act as enforcers and 
regulators of the new policies that were instituted by the ministries (Avdasheva et al., 2005; 
Tambovtsev, 2004). In this the proposed scheme, each agency/service was expected to function 
within a clear accountability framework that was created by a specific Ministry and report to a 
specific Minister. This presupposed the creation of those mechanisms through which public 
services are provided by organizations of varying organizational and legal forms.  
Zherebtsov (2014) claimed that the public administration reform, which was based on NPM 
ideology, contradicted the nature of the political process that was established during the 
presidency of Vladimir Putin and referred to as the ‘vertical of power’
1
. He argues that this 
                                                            
1
 The power vertical concept aimed at justifying the recentralization of the federal centre power in the Russian 
Federation. Monaghan (2012, p. 1) defined it as ‘governing from the top’ through “appointing loyal figures to 
important positions to implement policy decisions”. 
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reform “has not yet resulted in significant improvements in the governance of the country” 
(Zherebtsov, 2014, p. ii). "The conceptual inconsistency between the reform’s ideological 
background, on the one hand, and the mainstream political process that is based on the 
doctrine of the ‘power vertical’” were claimed as the primary reasons for reforms’ failures 
(Zherebtsov, 2014, p. 436). 
Evidence of moving away from Western-type of liberal paradigms in state governance included 
the passage of a new federal law on strategic planning in Russia in June 2014. The policy-
makers who were involved in the drafting of the law nicknamed this legislation “the network-
based Gosplan 2.0” referring to the Russian acronym for the agency in charge of the central 
economic planning in the USSR – Gosplan (Rozhkova, 2014). According to this law, strategic 
planning is to be introduced into the work of federal and regional authorities, and into the 
activities of public sector enterprises and state-owned companies. After the full adoption of this 
law, the federation, all regions and so-called “macro-regions” (e.g., Russian Arctic zone, Siberia, 
and the Far East and federal districts), all industries and state-owned enterprises are expected 
to adopt mid-term (6 years) and long-term (12 years) forecasts, strategies and detailed plans 
for their implementation. 
 
4.2. ‘Talks’ and ‘Decisions’ on Reforms of Russian Government Budgeting 
The introduction of the Budget Process Reform, as briefly described in section 4.1, caused quite 
a stir in Russian mass media. Colorful headings, such as “A Reform for the People”, “A Real 
Breakthrough in Boosting the Efficiency”, or “A Budgetary Revolution” appeared in Russian 
newspapers (see, e.g., Kommersant; Finansovye Izvestia) and online media. According to the 
NEI-Moscow News (2004), the reason for this was obviously to ensure that the government 
officials work for the citizens, and to hold them accountable to the citizens. The modernization 
of the entire budget process was intended to be at the foundation of the Russia’s program of 
economic transformation and development with a primary goal of “boosting accountability in 
government expenditures”. Advocates of this reform stressed that granting managers more 
autonomy in place of asking them for more accountability for the consequences of their 
decisions would enhance the quality and efficiency of provided services (Avdasheva et al., 2005, 
Tambovtsev, 2004). As former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov stated, “the budget 
policy’s restrictive impact on [business] opportunities, its inability to maximally make use of 
federal finances, and the necessity to create conditions that correspond to government 
priorities” were the primary drivers for the change (Russia Journal, 2004a). 
The Federal Ministry of Finance executives, responsible for policy-making in budget regulation, 
indicate the stages of the reform, summarize prior achievements and announce future goals. In 
addition, they attach core policies or legal regulations to these stages. For the purpose of this 
paper, two articles are analyzed that were published in the Russian practice-oriented journal 
Finansy i Byudjet: Problemy i Resheniya and that were written by Federal Ministry of Finance 
executives Aleksei Lavrov and Tatiana Nesterenko (Lavrov, 2005; Nesterenko, 2008). Currently, 
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Lavrov holds a post of vice-minister (previously, the head of Department of Budget Policy), 
while Nesterenko is a senior vice-minister (previously, the head of Russian Federal Treasury).   
Nesterenko stresses the importance of bringing the experience of financial management in the 
private sector into public finances. In her own words, “One should work on clarifying the aim 
and the measurement of public expenditure outcomes, design the monitoring systems and the 
internal audit, learn to compare public sector with similar commercial organizations” 
(Nesterenko, 2008, p. 5). In addition, Nesterenko states that a government entity should be 
managed in a manner that is very similar to how a corporation is governed in regards to the 
division of responsibilities, delegation and asset management.  
Lavrov appeals to the experience of developed countries and Russia’s partners within CIS, and 
claims that budget reforms are inevitable and are vital for country’s competitiveness. Lavrov 
devotes much of his analysis to Russia’s nascent experience in building budget federalism, and 
states that the achievements made prior to 2004 should not be neglected and undermined, 
thus stressing the importance of a balanced approach to reforms. Lavrov builds on the 
international practice of budget reforms and uses English terms such as “Performance Oriented 
Budgeting”, “Medium-Term Expenditure Framework” and “Result-Oriented Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework”. The “Result-Oriented Medium Term Expenditure Framework” is 
claimed to be the normative model for Russia. In regards to the two alternatives, strengthening 
external controls or “optimal decentralization”, Lavrov appreciates the latter, referring to it as 
“the only real” recipe (Lavrov, 2005, p. 4). Public entities should compete for resources to a 
certain extent and demonstrate that they provide the most efficient and transparent use of 
taxpayers’ money. According to Lavrov, the new budget classification that was established in 
2004 should bring Russian budget system closer to the international standards and provide the 
basis for implementing management accounting principles (Lavrov, 2005, p. 8). Significant 
improvements were introduced in 2006: the three-year financial plan, the extended use of 
programs, and annual plan-achievement reports. Notably, the program share of the 2005 
federal budget was only 7 percent. In 2014, all expenditures of the federal budget were 
exclusively within programs. The plan-achievement reports have not been accustomed to the 
same extent as the programs and three-year budgets. 
Nesterenko and Lavrov mention several federal documents that form the regulative framework 
of budget and reforms. These documents include the Budget Code in three editions, the 
Program of development of budget federalism in the Russian Federation until 2005, the 
Concept of the Budget Process Reform for 2004-2006, and certain laws that regulate various 
aspects of the budget process and legal and economic states of public sector entities. The legal 
basis for all budgets in Russia is the Budget Code. However, the Budget Code is very detailed 
and technically oriented. To provide a conceptual perspective for budget reforms, this study 
analyzes the Concept of the Budget Process Reform for 2004 – 2006 that was endorsed by 
Cabinet Resolution # 249 on May 22
nd
, 2004 (hereafter, the concept) as a broadly scoped frame-
setting document. The concept was followed by an April 30
th
 Russian Cabinet’s of Ministers 
Resolution # 225, which created a commission for augmenting the efficiency of government 
expenditures under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov, who was 
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empowered to guide this reform effort (Diamond, 2005). Deputy Prime Minister Zhukov 
stressed that implementing the concept would be a step of vital social significance.  
The primary objective of the reform process, as stated in the concept, was “to lay down 
preconditions and prerequisites for the most effective allocation and management of 
government finances by appropriate prioritization of various governmental activities 
considered having a critical bearing on a country’s development” (p. 2). In essence, the reform 
process was meant to move away from the costs and inputs [administration of resources] 
towards goals and outputs [management by results] by “strengthening the accountability and 
widening the managerial autonomy within a medium-term financial planning framework” (p. 2). 
The adoption of a modern budget management model, which is directly translated from 
Russian as “results-oriented budgeting”, was “the nucleus of the up-to-date organization of the 
budget process” (p. 3), aimed at forging a more direct link between allocating resources 
through the budget and the ability to meet the government objectives.   
As derived from above, the primary goal of the concept was to make administrators of budget 
funds (line ministries and agencies) more accountable and to better monitor their performance. 
The budget is to be formulated on the basis of a clear-cut ex-ante specification of the 
performance that is expected of each budget administrator. As a consequence of the 
transformation process, budget appropriations should be directly linked to the various 
government functions and divided into distinctly individual programs. They are to be set in a 
medium-term budget framework, in the sense of a rolling forecast of fiscal aggregates for the 
budget year plus two forward years (Lavrov, 2004).  
The resources that are allocated to the programs should be determined and grouped under the 
responsibility of administrators of the budget funds (referred to as “Subjects of Budget 
Planning”). These administrators should have a degree of managerial autonomy and freedom 
for decision-making to achieve the tasks that are assigned to them. For instance, the concept 
allowed allocations to be freely redistributed by administrators within each program. 
Concurrently, as was clearly emphasized in the text of the concept, line ministries and agencies 
are to be held directly accountable for meeting a contracted level of outputs through carrying 
out monitoring and subsequent external audits of finances and results of activities to ensure 
that effective budgetary performance is rewarded and poor performance is penalized.  
The new reform agenda was announced to encompass the following five policy headings 
(Timoshenko, 2006, p. 90; see Appendix 2 for a detailed discussion): 
1. Modernizing the budget classification and government accounting. 
2. Distinguishing between the present (“deystvuushikh”) and newly proposed/assumed 
policy (“prinimaemykh”) commitments when preparing the budget. 
3. Enhancing medium-term financial planning. 
4. Developing program- and performance-based methods of budget planning. 
5. Improving and streamlining procedures of budget preparation and approval. 
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Since the concept was approved, norms have radically changed. Four laws that were approved 
in 2007, 2010, 2012 and 2013 were enacted and resulted in significant changes in the Budget 
Code. These changes introduced target programs in 2007 that evolved in 2013 into state 
programs that enhance the governance of public sector organizations and clarify redistribution 
policies and instruments, which are referred to as “interbudgetary relations”. Certain 
practitioners perceive these changes as part of an ongoing process, as implied by the following 
statement, “doing reforms is similar to riding a bicycle: if you stop turning pedals – you fall”. 
Recently, a major change in the budget regulation occurred in 2012 with the approval of a new 
edition of the Budget Code. The primary feature of this change was the full-fledged 
introduction of state programs, which by 2014 represented the last significant budget 
‘innovation’ on the federal level.  
The context of the Russian state presents numerous controversies. Various ideas influence the 
official agenda and many different drivers affect the decision-making. Both practitioners and 
researchers are aware of these controversies and inconsistencies. Certain professionals 
propose philosophical or historical backgrounds for these controversies and inconsistencies and 
refer to the heraldic symbol of Russia that was inherited from the Russian Empire: the double-
headed eagle, one head looking east and one head looking west. Therefore, Western-like liberal 
norms and regulations may coexist with anti-Western traditionalist rhetoric that positions 
Russians as a sovereign and self-sufficient society. Perhaps it is Russian tradition to adopt and 
adapt foreign solutions, enhance them for internal use, while maintaining a strong survival 
instinct of historical sediments and a capability of fostering local creativity for using alien 
practices in a highly centralized environment. 
 
5. Discussion 
Elaborating on the ideological contrasts between the Russian tradition of statehood and the 
implied neoliberal background of NPM ideology, the institutional logic approach offers deeper 
insights. The state of Russia is recognized for advance planning, forecasting and top-down 
mobilization, which was inherited from the Soviet past. However, NPM-inspired changes result 
in market mechanisms, decentralization, and autonomy. The philosophical and ideological 
background of the Soviet state was based on Hegelian and Marx’s dialectics, which claim that 
contradictions are the sources of development. To a degree, this corresponds to the 
institutional change that Thornton and Ocasio (2008) describe in the following: “The 
contradictions inherent in the differentiated set of institutional logics provide individuals, 
groups, and organizations with cultural resources for transforming individual identities, 
organizations, and society” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p.101). Therefore, the contradictions 
between logics may better explain the controversies of the Russian context and help better 
understand recent public sector reforms in Russia. 
The empirical evidence gathered in this paper shows that, although the ongoing accounting and 
budgeting reforms in Russia were implemented top-down, they replicated certain features of 
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NPM. In the Russian context, it is generally perceived to align with recent international trends 
and best practices that are commonly found in OECD countries. As documented by Timoshenko 
and Adhikari (2009), the transformation process in Russia was substantially affected by 
overseas forces through large international organizations such as the IMF, the WB, and the 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) that question the prevailing 
budgeting and accounting systems, dispense advice on how to alter them, and ensure financial 
support. In addition to the evidence of NPM, this analysis notes the existence of a sequencing 
approach or a systematic chain of “should do” and “must do” changes that are promoted by 
authors or publications who are close to the IMF or other international financial institutions 
(Allen, 2009; Bietenhader and Bergman, 2010). The formation and reformation of systems of 
norms that regulate government budgeting in Russia can be clearly separated into three stages 
(see Appendix 3). These stages are delineated by clear patterns of continuity and change in the 
central government budgetary norms.  
The first stage, management of expenditures, began with the establishment of the Russian state 
in 1991 and continued until 2004. This stage included the creation of the Federal Treasury and 
the launch of cash-based budgetary accounting. The dominant institutional pressure was 
coercive isomorphism, primarily from the IMF and the WB. In addition, PA logic served as the 
prevalent prototype that guided the changes during this period. The second stage, the 
transitional period, began in 2004 and proceeded until 2008. This stage was characterized by a 
clear-cut reference to NPM-like rhetoric, which distanced the Russian state from the legacy of 
the Soviet past and moved towards the adoption of budgetary rules and provisions that are 
commonly found in the West. Appeals for greater efficiency, effectiveness, accrual accounting 
and performance management were widely heard in the country during this period. The 
normative isomorphism of the IMF and the WB replaced coercive pressures by eliminating the 
dependency on their funds and continued close coordination with the Russian Ministry of 
Finance. 
Since 2008, the state of Russia has embarked on a new on-going wave of budgetary reforms 
that is commonly referred to as management of outcomes. Performance measurement and 
performance management, programs, mid-term plans and strategic planning have all been 
introduced during the third period. This is indeed the most complex and controversial stage 
because of a marked interplay of elements that stem from NPM, NPG and even the NWS. The 
normative influence of supra-national institutions remains considerable and penetrates 
academic education and research. Although large-scale anti-western rhetoric and the 
demonized image of the West dominate Russia’s political realm, the country’s political elite rely 
on a comprehensive package of Western public sector methodologies while promoting the 
positive image of the Russian state in the international arena.                  
Although the primary impression is that reform discourses in Russia have been dominated by 
NPM logic, there is evidence that other logics are present (see Table 1). This table is followed by 
a broader discussion on Russian traditions, including resistance to incorporating Western 
management accounting practices into the central government. The prerequisites for hybridity 
at the practice level are also discussed. 
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Insert Table 1 
This study does not provide all of the evidence that exists, but rather the evidence that is the 
most illustrative. Pollitt (2009) denies the proliferation of PA mechanisms in post-Soviet 
countries, ruling out the prerequisites for NWS in these contexts, claiming that “for Eastern 
Europe the most important influence is not the Weberian model but the Russian/Soviet model” 
(Pollitt, 2009, p. 14). However, during the initial stage of reforms (before 2004), there were 
numerous features that may be similar to the logic of PA. Within the studied period, the NPM 
logic dominates not only the rhetoric but is also connected to reform facilitators or supra-
national institutions. The peculiarity of the Russian context is that performance measurement 
and the use of performance management systems expanded simultaneously in Russia’s private 
and state-owned corporations and in the public sector organizations. To a certain extent, the 
government was more modern and innovative than the private business organizations.  
Various methods can be used to interpret the empirical evidence for describing the outcomes 
of public sector reforms. Hyndman et al. (2014) trace the emergence of diverse paradigms in 
public sector discourses by attaching specific concepts to each of the paradigms. In the 
interpretation of their findings, Hyndman et al. (2014) use the idea of layers. In a historical 
study of accounting in Russia, Bourmistrov (1999) relies on the notion of sediments. Lapsley and 
Pallot (2000) use the term accounting mutations. All three concepts imply the distinctions and 
as in the case of the UK (Kurunmaki et al., 2003), may be beneficial for describing the tensions 
between ideologies, potential conflicts and the imposition of public sector reforms. Kurunmäki 
(2004) relies on the idea of hybridization that implies the willing acceptance of new practices. 
To a degree, this line of reasoning corresponds to Mennicken’s (2004; 2008; 2010) conclusions 
regarding Russia in her studies of the introduction and the use of international auditing 
standards within post-Soviet audit firms. Through the theoretical lenses proposed by Foucault 
and Latour, the international harmonization in audit is perceived as translation. Using the 
“connecting worlds” metaphor (Mennicken, 2008) and the notion of “linked ecologies” 
(Mennicken, 2010), Mennicken reports that marketization and harmonization projects are 
often idealized. Although government initiatives may occasionally be willingly accepted, there 
are other important forces that influence the process of translation that may result in 
unexpected outcomes. Therefore, the hybrid concept that is proposed by governmentality 
studies (e.g. Kurunmäki and Miller, 2011) presents an alternative understanding of the 
translation of global ideas into a local context; therefore, it may be interesting to review the 
outcomes of public sector reforms in Russia at the level of budgeting norms.  
The concept of hybrid has many dimensions. For accounting researchers, this term would most 
likely refer to a hybrid system that combines cash and accruals (e.g. Jones and Caruana, 2014). 
Attempts have been made to claim that a hybrid model of public management reform would be 
a better solution than a ‘pure’ NPM model (Brown et al., 2003). Christensen and Lægreid (2011) 
provide a broad discussion of what hybrid may represent in a public sector setting:  
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“Hybridity in the public sector may also mean different things. For some the concept is similar 
to complexity. For others, they denote different structural and cultural dimensions or features 
existing together. Hybrid organizations can, for example, signify quasi-governmental 
organizations that exist at the interface between the public and private sector (Lan and Rainey, 
1992), which may be either market or civil society organizations (Koppell, 2003); the mixture of 
market and hierarchy (Williamson 1991); the combination of political advocacy and service 
provision (Minkoff, 2002); or the mixture of different structural forms inside the ministry, in 
relation to agencies, state-owned enterprises and regional and local government (Kickert, 2001; 
Pollitt et al., 2007). Hybrid is also the term used to characterize various cultural elements such 
as professional cultures, in different parts of government”. (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011, p. 
410). Whether the hybrid reforms, the prerequisites for which the study seems to have found in 
Russia are functional or working [which is a core feature of a hybrid (Jacobs, 2005)], remains 
unknown. However, the analysis manifests that new concepts rarely ‘oust’ or replace the old 
concepts, which make the norms more complex and allow the authors of this study to claim 
that they are functional. Hybridization and hybrids are considered promising in terms of their 
scientific value but also may offer a more realistic approach for practitioners, particularly 
policymakers and reform designers (Brown et al., 2003).  
It is a challenge to introduce a reform in a top-down manner when that reform was designed to 
enhance bottom-up democratic mechanisms. Although it is possible to identify different logics 
through the study of norms, the institutional work approach (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; 
Lawrence et al., 2009, 2011) may be more beneficial for studying practices of government 
budgeting in Russia and may provide information on the nature of possible hybridity in Russia’s 
central government budgeting.  
  
6. Conclusions  
The purpose of this study was to identify a potentially novel configuration or the so-called 
“third way” of how NPM-like public sector reforms may be instituted in a complex, fast-
changing and unexplored context. The paper sought to contribute to existing knowledge 
regarding the Russian public sector in times of change by exploring the developments in the 
Russian central government’s budgeting norms. This study covered a 15 year period (2000 until 
2015) that is known for dramatic changes in Russia’s public sector (Antipova and Bourmistrov, 
2013). This study focused on budgeting provisions that were instituted in Russia during this 
period at the macro-level and therefore, has limitations with regard to scope. The theoretical 
frame of reference incorporated concepts from a newly emerging stream of new institutional 
theory, the institutional logics approach (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Broadening the argument 
of Wiesel and Modell (2014), the authors of this study claim that the public sector reform 
paradigms that were formulated by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) may be understood as 
competing logics. The primary method for gathering data for this study was a document search. 
The system of norms, which regulates the system of actions (Bergevärn et al., 1995), was 
analyzed through the study of ‘talks’ and ‘decisions’ regarding public sector reforms as 
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suggested by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011). The public sector discourses framework that was 
proposed by Hyndman et al. (2014) was adopted and developed to find evidence of four public 
sector reform paradigms in Russia’s budgetary framework.  
The study shows that, although the Russian setting is distinct from that of OECD countries, the 
similar processes of hybridization and “nationalization” of NPM-like arrangements are 
apparent. However, unlike previous studies regarding Russia’s public sector reforms (e.g. 
Timoshenko, 2008; Antipova and Bourmistrov, 2013), this study raises doubts as to whether the 
NPM ideology served as a prototype or a normative model for Russia’s policy-makers to 
implement changes. It is argued in this paper that, along with the NPM trend, the nascent 
system of governmental budgeting is a result of other public sector reform discourses and 
certain ideas that were inherited from the Soviet past and the strong ideological rhetoric of 
Russia’s political elite, aimed to boost the image of the Russian state as a modern and 
progressive player in the international arena. The empirical evidence demonstrates that 
Russia’s budgetary framework possesses inherent features that are pertinent to each paradigm. 
These features include, but are not limited to, NPM-like performance measurement and 
performance management, a strong reliance on legislation that is more reminiscent of PA 
tradition than NPM, and elements of NPG and the NWS such as consolidated budgets and 
reports, participatory budgeting and the role of the state as the primary provider of welfare. 
Therefore, it is very likely that all the four public sector discourses have acted in concert to 
transform Russia’s budgetary framework, with the power and potency of each paradigm 
varying over time, given the particular set of actors and circumstances in place.   
Notably, it is beyond the authors’ comprehension to name any of those four as the prevailing or 
dominant ideology behind the transformation process in contemporary Russia. First, one of the 
most visible features of the last decade or so in the nation has been the growing centralization 
of power, so it is not a pure NPM model that underlies the on-going changes. Next, the 
mobilization of core democratic mechanisms has been merely ceremonial, implying that it is 
not PA, which subsequently rules out the NWS, as claimed by Pollitt (2009). Furthermore, it is 
not NPG because of a clear-cut focus on hierarchy and vertical subordination rather than 
coordination and governance. Lastly, the study documented recent and assiduous endeavors to 
reinvent the Soviet legacy through the adoption of a new federal law on strategic planning.  
The case of Russian governmental budgeting is indeed telling. Although with varying power and 
potency over time, all four public sector reform discourses outlined above have co-existed in 
one setting and are deemed somewhat reflected in the content of central government 
budgetary provisions. This study claims that a hybrid of the four prototypes may offer a richer 
and broader understanding of Russian governmental budgeting than any single model. 
Arguably, all this is very much indicative of a hybrid nature of public sector management reform 
in contemporary Russia. 
In alignment with Christensen and Lægreid (2011), this research addresses the implications of 
hybridity for public sector reforms.  The authors of this study believe that a prerequisite for the 
emergence of a hybrid is a situation where the aspiration to achieve external legitimacy collides 
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with the requirement of maintaining internal legitimacy. Indeed, the complexity and 
sophistication of Russia’s public sector regulations may be unintended; however, they may be 
the inevitable consequences of a centralized and politicized environment where the changes 
are conditioned by competing institutional logics. 
Echoing Brown et al. (2003), this study proposes that the hybrid concept may be beneficial in 
understanding the institutional developments of a public sector, particularly for unexplored 
contexts such as Russia where existing approaches that primarily describe well-studied contexts 
of developed and (to a lesser extent) developing countries hardly appear to be relevant. 
However, hybridization and hybrid concepts are somewhat controversial and relying on these 
concepts is often criticized for overstretching the implications of the term, hybrid. The broad 
use of the term often occurs in the field of governmental accounting, where hybrids solely refer 
to a blended system of cash and accruals. The authors of this paper acknowledge that the 
hybrid concept has not yet gained sufficient analytical strength and has not been sufficiently 
institutionalized to form a paradigm either in research or in policy-making practice. The concept 
of hybridization is not new, but surely has a value, because governments must assess local 
conditions and consider what is good for them, rather than blindly accepting top-down 
internationally dictated models. Finally, unlike Brown et al. (2003), the authors of this study do 
not claim that the hybrid model is a superior normative model for policy-makers but rather 
suggest that this model is a promising concept for research purposes. In addition, it is 
recommended that future studies deal with this issue at the practice level. 
 
Acknowledgment 
This paper is a result of the BUDRUS (Local government budgeting reforms in Russia: 
implications and tensions) international research project, funded by the Research Council of 
Norway and operated by Nord University Business School. We are immensely grateful to our 
project partners who provided valuable insights and expertise that greatly assisted the 
research, although they may not agree with all of the interpretations/conclusions of this paper. 
  
  
Page 19 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
20 
 
References  
Allen, R. (2009). The Challenge of Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Developing Countries, IMF Working Paper 
WP/09/96, International Monetary Fund. 
Antipova, T., & Bourmistrov, A. (2011). Is Russian public sector accounting in the process of modernization? 
Analysis of the Public Sector Accounting Reforms in Russia from Perspectives of International Development 
Trends. Paper presented at the 14th CIGAR Conference Gent, June 8
th
 - 9
th
. 
Antipova, T., & Bourmistrov, A. (2013). Is Russian Public Sector Accounting in the Process of Modernization? An 
Analysis of Accounting Reforms in Russia, Financial Accountability and Management, 29(4), 0267-4424. 
Avdasheva, S. B., Kryuchkova, P. V., Mishina, E. A., Petukhova, O. V., Shartitko, A. E., & Tambovtsev, V. L. (2005). 
Reform of the Budgeting Process in Russia: 2004-2005. Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy 
(RECEP), Moscow. 
Bandy, G. (2011). Financial management and accounting in the public sector. Routledge. 
Beliakov, S., Lugachyov, M., & Markov, A. (1998). Financial and Institutional Change in Russian Higher Education.  
Center for Economic Reform and Transformations. Retrieved from http://www.hw.ac.uk. 
Bergevärn, L.E., Mellemvik, F., & Olson, O.  (1995). Institutionalization of municipal accounting – a comparative 
study between Sweden and Norway. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 11(1), 25-41. 
Bietenhader, D., & A. Bergmann (2010). Principle for sequencing public financial reforms in developing countries. 
International Public Management Review, 11(1). Retrieved from http://www.ipmr.net. 
Bourmistrov, A.  (2001). Accounting and Transition: A study of Russian local governmental accounting (Doctoral 
thesis for the degree of dr. Oecon, Norwegian school of economics and business administration, Bergen, 
Norway). 
Bourmistrov, A. (2006). Reforming Central Government Accounting: A Comparative Study of Norway and Russia, in 
E. Lande and J.-C. Scheid (eds) Accounting Reform In The Public Sector: Mimicry, Fad Or Necessity, La Revue 
Du Trésor and Ecm (Expert-Compatible Media). 
Bourmistrov, A., & Mellemvik, F. (1999). Russian local governmental reforms: autonomy for accounting 
development. European Accounting Review, 8(4), 675-700. 
Bourmistrov, A., & Mellemvik, F. (2002). Exploring accounting and democratic governance: a study comparing 
Norwegian and Russian counties. Financial Accountability and Management, 18 (4), 331-353. 
Brown, K., Waterhouse, J., & Christine, F. (2003). Is a hybrid model a better alternative for public sector agencies? 
The International Journal of Public Sector Management, 16(3), 230-241. 
Brunsson, N., & Olsen, J. P. (1993). The Reforming Organization. London: Routledge. 
Budäus, D., & Buchholtz (1996). Controlling Local Government Cost and Performance. In Chan, J. L., Jones, R., and 
Lüder, K. (eds.) Research in Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting, JAI Press, Greenwich, Vol. 9, (pp. 33-
57). Business Week. 
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2011). Complexity and Hybrid Public Administration—Theoretical and Empirical 
Challenges. Public Organization Review, 11, 407–423. 
Chuen, C. (2004). The 2004 Russian Government Reforms. CNS, Monetary Institute of International Studies. 
Coen, D., & Roberts, A. (2012). A New Age of Uncertainty. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions, 25(1), 5-9. 
Czarniawska, B. (2008). How to misuse institutions and get away with it: some reflections on Institutional 
Page 20 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
21 
 
theory(ies)”. In Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Suddaby, R., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of 
Organizational Institutionalism (pp. 769-782).  
Czarniawska, B. (2009). Emerging institutions: Pyramids or Anthills? Organization Studies, 30(4), 423-441. 
Dabla-Norris, E., Allen, R., Zanna, L.-F., Prakash, T., Kvintradze, E., Lledo, V., Yackovlev, I., & Gollwitzer, S. (2010). 
Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income Countries. IMF Working Paper 10/80. 
Diamond, J. (2002). The new Russian budget system: a critical assessment and future reform agenda. OECD Journal 
on Budgeting, 2(3), 119-146. 
Diamond, J. (2005). Reforming the Russian budget system: a move to more devolved budget management. IMF 
Working Paper 05/104. 
Diamond, J. (2006). Budget System Reform in Emerging Economies. The challenges and the reform agenda. IMF 
Occasional Paper 245. 
Dillard, J. (1991). Accounting as a Critical Social Science. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 4(1), 8-28. 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality 
in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147-160. 
Drechsler, W. (2013). Three paradigms of governance and administration: Chinese, Western and Islamic. Society 
and Economy, 35(3), 319–342. 
Drechsler, W., & Kattel, R. (2008). Towards the Neo-Weberian State? Perhaps, but Certainly Adieu, NPM! The 
NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy Special Issue: A Distinctive European Model? The Neo-
Weberian State Vol.1, Number 2 2008/2009, pp. 95-99. 
Eliassen, K. A., & Kooiman, J. (1993). “Introduction”. In Eliassen, K. A. and Kooiman, J. (Eds.) Managing Public 
Organizations – Lessons from Contemporary European Experience (pp. 1-9), London, Sage. 
Federal Antimonopoly Service (2016). Report of Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation “On the 
state of competition in 2015”. Retrieved from http://fas.gov.ru/about/list-of-reports/report.html?id=1685. 
Accessed 30 Nov 2016. 
Finansovye Izvestia (Financial News), (2004). The MoF will Carry out a Budgetary Revolution, 15 April. 
Garrod, N., & McLeay, S. (1996). “The Accounting Implications of Political and Economic Reform in Central 
Europe”. In Garrod, N. and McLeay, S. (Eds.) Accounting in Transition: The Implications of Political and 
Economic Reform in Central Europe, (pp. 1-11). Routledge, London.  
Gårseth-Nesbakk, L., & Timoshenko, K. (2014). “The functions of accounting revisited – New Meanings and 
Directions” in Bourmistrov, A., Olson, O. (Eds.) “Accounting, Management Control and Institutional 
Development”, (pp. 141-156). Cappelen Damm Academisk, Oslo.  
Grønhaug, K., Mellemvik, F., & Olson, O. (1997). ”Editorial: Accounting in a Scandinavian Research Context”. 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, 13(1), 1-3. 
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 69, 3-19. 
Hood, C. (1995). The ‘New public management’ in the 1980-s: variations on a theme. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 20(2/3), 93-109. 
Hood, C., & Dixon, R. (2015). A Government that Worked Better and Cost Less? Evaluating Three Decades of Reform 
and Change in UK Central Government. Oxford: University Press.   
Hood, C., & Dixon, R. (2016). Not What It Said on the Tin? Reflections on Three Decades of UK Public Management 
Reform. Financial Accountability & Management, 32(4), 409-428. 
Page 21 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
22 
 
Hyndman, N., & Lapsley, I. (2016). New Public Management: The Story Continues. Financial Accountability & 
Management, 32(4), 385-408. 
Hyndman, N., Liguori, M., Meyer, R., Polzer, T., Rota, S., & Seiwald, J. (2014). The translation and sedimentation of 
accounting reforms. A comparison of the UK, Austrian and Italian experiences. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 25. 
IMF (2013). International Monetary Fund Country Report No. 13/310 Russian Federation. 
Jacobs, K. (2005). Hybridization or polarization: doctors and accounting in the UK, Germany and Italy. Financial 
Accountability & Management, 21(2), 135-161. 
Jones, R., & Caruana, J. (2014). Central government accounting reform in Malta: is it just an illusion? Bank of 
Valletta Review, 49. 
Jones, R., Lande, E., Lüder, K, & Portal, M. (2013). A Comparison of Budgeting and Accounting Reforms in the 
national governments of France, Germany, the UK and the US. Financial Accountability and Management, 
29(4), 419-441. 
Kickert, W. J. M. (2001). Public management of hybrid organizations: governance of quasi-autonomous 
organizations. International Public Management Journal, 4(2), 135–150. 
Kommersant (2004). Administrative Reform, No. 86, 18 May, p. 5. 
Koppell, J. G. S. (2003). The politics of quasi-government. Hybrid organizations and the dynamics of bureaucratic 
control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kurunmäki, L. (2004). A Hybrid Profession: The Acquisition of Management Accounting Expertise by Medical 
Professionals. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29, 327–348. 
Kurunmäki, L., & Miller, P. (2006). Modernizing government: the calculating self, hybridization and performance 
management. Financial Accountability and Management, 22 (1), 87-106. 
Kurunmäki, L., & Miller, P. (2011). Regulatory hybrids: partnerships, budgeting and modernizing government. 
Management Accounting Research, 22, 220-241. 
Kurunmäki, L., Lapsley, I., & Melia, K. (2003). Accountingization v. legitimation: a comparative study of the use of 
accounting information in intensive care. Management Accounting Research, 14, 112-139. 
Lan, Z., & Rainey, H. G. (1992). Goals, rules, and effectiveness in public, private and hybrid organizations: more 
evidence on frequent assertions about differences. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
2(1), 5–28. 
Lapsley, I. (2000). Management accounting and the state: Making sense of complexity. Management Accounting 
Research, 11, 169-173. 
Lapsley, I. (2001). The changing public sector: from transition to transformation. European Accounting Review, 
10(3), 501-504. 
Lapsley, I. (2008). The NPM Agenda: Back to the Future. Financial Accountability and Management, 24 (1), 77-95. 
Laughlin, R. (1988). Accounting in Its Social Context: An Analysis of the Accounting Systems of the Church of 
England. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 1(2), 19-42. 
Lavrov, A.M. (2005). Budget reform 2001-2008: from management of expenditures to management of outcomes 
(Бюджетная реформа 2001-2008 гг.: от управления затратами к управлению результатами). Finance 
and Budget: problems and solutions (Финансы и бюджет: проблемы и решения), 9, 3–12. Retrieved from 
http://fin.tmbreg.ru/site/fin/files/BudgetReformation/lavrov.pdf.  
Page 22 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
23 
 
Lawrence, T., & Suddaby, R., (2006). Institutions and institutional work. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. B. Lawrence, & 
W. R. Nord (Eds.) Handbook of organization studies, 2
nd
 Edition: 21, (pp. 5-254). London: Sage. 
Lawrence, T., Suddaby, R., & Leca, B. (2009). Institutional work. Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of 
Organizations. Cambridge University Press. 
Lawrence, T., Suddaby, R., & Leca, B. (2011). Institutional work: refocusing institutional studies of organization. 
Journal of Management Inquiry, 20(1), 52–58. 
Lüder, K. (2002). Accrual Accounting and Budgeting in Government – A History of the Hessian “New Administrative 
Management (NVS)” Project. Retrieved from http://www.dhv-speyer.de/lueder/NVS%20Englisch.pdf.  
Lynn, L. E. (2008). What is a Neo-Weberian State? Retrieved from http://iss.fsv.cuni.cz.  
March, J., & Olsen, J. (1995). Democratic Governance. Free Press, New York. 
Mellemvik, F., & Olson, O. (1996). Regnskap i Forandring. Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, Oslo. 
Mellemvik, F., Monsen, N., & Olson, O. (1988). Functions of Accounting – A Discussion. Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 4(3/4), 101-119. 
Mellet, H. (2002). The Consequences and Causes of Resource Accounting. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 13, 
231-254. 
Mennicken, A. (2004). Moving West: The Emergence, Reform and Standardization of Audit Practices in Post-Soviet 
Russia. A thesis presented by Andrea Maria Mennicken to the University of London for a Degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy. London.   
Mennicken, A. (2008). “Connecting worlds: The translation of international auditing standards into post-Soviet 
audit practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33, 384–414. 
Mennicken, A. (2010). From inspection to auditing: Audit and markets as linked ecologies. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 35, 334–359. 
Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. American 
Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363. 
Mezias, S. J. (1990). An Institutional Model of Organizational Practice: Financial Reporting at the Fortune 200”. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 431-457.  
Miller, P. (1994). “Accounting as Social and Institutional practice: An Introduction”. In Hopwood, A. and Miller, P. 
(Eds.) Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice (pp. 1-39). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Minkoff, D. C. (2002). The emergence of hybrid organizational forms: combining identity-based service provision 
and political action. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 31(3), 377–401. 
Monaghan, A, (2012). The Vertikal: Power and Authority in Russia. International Affairs, 88(1), 1-16. Retrieved 
from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2012.01053.x/pdf.  
Moscow News (2004). Putin Aims to Double GDP by 2010, 26 May. Retrieved from http://www.mosnews.com.    
Naschold, F. (1995). The Modernization of the Public Sector in Europe. Helsinki. 
Nesterenko, T.G. (2008). The stages of the Budget Reform (Этапы бюджетной реформы). Finance and Budget: 
problems and solutions (Финансы и бюджет: проблемы и решения), 2, 3-7. Retrieved from 
http://www.roskazna.ru/upload/iblock/publikatsii/doc/1203200801.pdf.  
OECD (1995). Governance in Transition: Public Management Reforms in OECD Countries. OECD. 
Page 23 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
24 
 
OECD (2013). OECD “Better Policies” Series. Russia modernizing the economy. April 2013. OECD. 
Osborne, S. P. (2010). The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public 
Governance. Routledge.  
Parison, N., & Evans, G. (2004). Administrative and Civil Service Reform. Policy Note Prepared for Russian 
Federation authorities.   
Pollitt, C. (2008). “An Overview of the Papers and Propositions of the First Trans-European Dialogue (TED1)” The 
NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy Special Issue: A Distinctive European Model? The Neo-
Weberian State. Volume I, Number 2, Winter 2008/2009. 
Pollitt, C. (2009). Bureaucracies remember, post-bureaucratic organizations forget? Public Administration, 87(2), 
198-218. 
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). Public Management Reform. The comparative analysis. New Public 
Management, Governance and The Neo-Weberian State. Third edition. Oxford University Press. 
Pollitt, C., van Thiel, S., & Homburg, V. (Eds.). (2007). New public management in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Rozhkova, E. (2014). Strategic planning in Russia according to the new federal law. Presentation at Forum on 
Strategic Planning. Retrieved from http://www.forumstrategov.ru.  
Ruffner, M., & Sevilla, J. (2004). Public Sector Modernization: Modernizing Accountability and Control. OECD 
Journal on Budgeting, 4(2). 
Russia Journal (2004a). Fradkov Says a New, Development-based Economy would Help Russia Double its GDP, 14 
April. 
Russia Journal (2004b). Budget Aim is to Double GDP, 23 August.  
Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2001). “National, International and Transnational Constructions of New Public 
Management”. In Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (eds.) New Public Management: The Transformation of 
Ideas in Practice (pp. 43-72). Ashgate: Aldershot.  
Tambovtsev, V. L. (2004). Regulation Inside Government: The Theory, International Experience, Russian Reforms. 
Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy (RECEP), Moscow. 
Ter Bogt J., H., & Van Helden, J.G. (2000). Accounting change in Dutch government: Exploring the gap between 
expectations and Realizations. Management Accounting Research, 11, 263–279. 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the Historical contingency of Power in Organizations: 
Executive Succession in the Higher Education Publishing Industry, 1958-1990. The American Journal of 
Sociology, 105(3), 801-843. 
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). “Institutional logics” in Greenwood et al. The SAGE Handbook of 
Organizational Institutionalism, (pp. 99-129). 
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics perspective: A new approach to 
culture, structure and process. Cambridge: Oxford University Press. 
Timoshenko, K. (2006). Russian government accounting: changes at the central level and at a university”. A thesis 
for the Degree of ‘Philosophiae Doctor’ (Ph.D.), Bodø. 
Timoshenko, K. (2008), Tracing changes in central government accounting: a case of Russia, in Jorge, S. (Ed.), 
Implementing Reforms in Public Sector Accounting, (pp. 183-199). Coimbra.  
Timoshenko, K., & Adhikari, P. (2009). Exploring Russian central government accounting in its context. Journal of 
Accounting and Organizational Change, 5 (4), 490-513. 
Page 24 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
25 
 
Timoshenko, K., & Adhikari, P. (2010). A two-country comparison of public sector accounting reforms: Same ideas, 
different paths? Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management, 22(4), 449-486. 
Tokarev, I. N. (2000.) Bukhgalterskyi Uchet v Budgetnych Uchregdenijax (Accounting in Budget Institutions). FBK-
Press Publisher, Moscow. 
Tragakes, E., & Lessof, S. (2003). Health Care Systems in Transition: Russian Federation. Copenhagen, European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Vol. 5(3). 
Veggeland, N. (2007). Paths of Public Innovation in the Global Age: Lessons from Scandinavia. Edward Edgar 
Publishing Limited. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice Hall, London. 
Webber, D. (2004). Managing the Public’s Money: From Outputs to Outcomes – and Beyond. OECD Journal on 
Budgeting, 4(2). 
Weber, M. (1922) 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkley, U. California Press. 
Wiesel, F., & Modell, S. (2014). From New Public Management to New Public Governance? Hybridisation and 
Implications for Public Sector Consumerism. Financial Accountability and Management, 30 (2), 175-205. 
Wildavsky, A. (1964, 1974). The politics of the budgetary process. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto. 
Wildavsky, A., & Caiden, N. (2001). The new politics of the budgetary process. Longman, New York. 
Wilson, W. (1887.). The Study of Administration. Political Science Quarterly, 2(2), 197-222. 
Zherebtsov, M. (2014). Public Administration Reform and Building of the ‘Vertical of Power’ in Russia: Exploring 
Incommensurability. A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, Carleton 
University Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 
Zilber, T. (2013). Institutional logics and Institutional work: should they be agreed? Research in the sociology of 
organizations, 39A, 77-96. 
 
 
  
Page 25 of 29
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/lpad  Email: afarazma@fau.edu
International Journal of Public Administration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
26 
 
Appendix 1 
The list of documents analyzed in the paper 
1. On the budget policy in 2000: budget address of the President of The Russian Federation to the 
Government of the Russian Federation, 12/04/1999 (О бюджетной политике на 2000 год: 
бюджетное Послание Президента РФ Правительству РФ от 12 апреля 1999 г.) 
2. The program of the development of the budget federalism in the Russian Federation until 2005 
(Программа развития бюджетного федерализма в Российской Федерации до 2005 г.) 
3. The concept of reforming of the budget process in the Russian Federation in 2004-2006 
(Концепция реформирования бюджетного процесса в Российской Федерации в 2004-2006 
гг.) 
4. On the measures on increasing the efficiency of the budget expenditure: the decree of the 
Government of the Russian Federation, # 249, issued 22.05.2004 (О мерах по повышению 
результативности бюджетных расходов: Постановление Правительства РФ от 22.05.2004 
№249) 
5. On the budget policy in 2010-2012: budget address of the President of The Russian Federation 
to the Government of the Russian Federation (О бюджетной политике в 2010-2012 годах: 
бюджетное послание Президента РФ Правительству РФ от 25.05.2009)   
6. Order of the Government of the Russian Federation “On approving the list of state programs of 
the Russian Federation” #1950-r, issued 11/11/2010 (Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 
11.11.2010 №1950-р «Об утверждении перечня государственных программ Российской 
Федерации») 
7. State program of the Russian Federation “Creating the conditions for efficient and responsible 
management of regional and municipal finances, increasing the sustainability of budgets of 
constituents of the Russian Federation” (Государственная программа РФ «Создание условий 
для эффективного и ответственного управления региональными и муниципальными 
финансами, повышения устойчивости бюджетов субъектов Российской Федерации») 
8. The program of increasing the efficiency of budget expenditure in the Russian Federation for the 
period 2010-2012 (Программа повышения эффективности бюджетных расходов в 
Российской Федерации на период до 2012 г.) 
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Appendix 2 
Five policy headings according to the Concept of reforming the budget process in Russia in 
2004-2006 (adopted from Timoshenko, 2006). 
To begin with, none of the aforementioned budgeting goals in support of boosting accountability, 
transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency in government expenditures was expected to be achieved 
without related changes in the accounting system. Reinventing Russian public accounts occupied the 
leading place among those policy directions laid down in The Concept of the Budget Process Reform. 
Along with the budget classification, the reforming of Russia’s public sector accounting system, as stated 
in the concept, was “… a necessary and indispensable precondition in modernizing a country’s budget 
process. Both the budget classification and accounting system should become a reliable tool that 
ensures transparency of those activities of the state bodies and administrators of budget resources, and 
provides with a wealth of financial information required throughout all the phases of the budget 
process, emanating from the analysis of the previous period’s financial results, to the preparation and 
presentation of the draft budget, and its execution throughout the fiscal year up to the generation of 
final accounts” (p. 4). Under this rubric, the objective of the transformation process was declared 
twofold. One was to make the budget classification closer to international best practice by incorporating 
the IMF GFS classification methodology. Another objective was to introduce a Chart of Accounts, 
integrated with the budget classification so that all spending units would be brought under a single 
budget classification and a single Chart of Accounts. The purpose of so doing was to enable the effect of 
decisions made in the fiscal and budgetary sphere on the stock of assets and liabilities to be judged 
upon, as well as for the assessment and preparation of reports on budget execution.  
The second policy measure was intended to cut significantly down the time devoted to the process of 
budget formulation and approval. To make things clearer, present commitments are those obligations, 
which are predetermined by varying compulsory provisions and regulations endorsed earlier and liable 
to be included in the budget automatically. On the other hand, the new assumed/proposed policy 
commitments envisage those expenditures, the insertion of which into the budget is dependent upon 
decisions being made directly in the course of budget preparation for the next fiscal year. To be included 
in the budget, the latter are to be subjected to thorough scrutiny. As were recognized, nearly 90-95 per 
cent of commitments were already “locked-in” so the truly new programs occupied 5-10 per cent of the 
budget (Diamond, 2005).  
The third element of the reform package aimed at ensuring the augmented reliability of medium-term 
forecasting for those resources available to budget managers. Specifically, the budget for the 
forthcoming fiscal year is to become a constituent part of an annually updated rolling multi-year 
(normally three-year) fiscal document. In analogy with Soviet five-year plans, some Russian mass media 
nicknamed these as three-year plans (Finansovye Izvestia, 2004).  
The fourth direction was declared to be the keystone of the reform package, directed at establishing a 
procedure for assessing the effectiveness of budget expenditures. Viewed in this way, it presupposed a 
step-by-step move away from the view of the budget as primarily focused on resource allocation and 
input control (so-called smeta financing or resource management) towards the program and 
performance-oriented budgeting.  
Finally, the fifth area of the transformation process envisaged the streamlining of procedures for budget 
preparation and budget approval to also meet the requirements of medium-term performance-oriented 
budgeting. In particular, the concept proposed the draft law on the federal budget for the next fiscal 
year to be approved in three readings as compared to the previous four.  
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Appendix 3. The Russian Budget Reform Framework (based on Lavrov, 2005 and Nesterenko, 
2008) 
Stages, main reform elements and targets Time period Corresponding 
document(s)  
Stage 1 – Management of Expenditures 
The main elements: 
- Cash-based accounting 
- Treasury  
- Targeting of expenditure plans 
- Redistribution methodology 
Targets: 
- Strengthening the budget system  
- Standardized cash accounting reports 
- External control of budget execution 
Prior 2004 1998 Budget Code; 
The Program of the 
development of 
budget federalism in 
the Russian 
Federation until 2005 
Stage 2 – Transitional period 
The main elements: 
- Performance oriented budgeting 
- Medium-term expenditure framework 
- Target programs 
Targets: 
- Enhanced quality of the budget system  
- Resource/Expenditure balance 
- Basis for performance-based budgeting and 
program-based budgeting  
2004-2008 2004 Budget Code;  
The Concept of 
reforming the budget 
process in the Russian 
Federation in 2004-
2006 
Stage 3 – Management of Outcomes 
The main elements: 
- Separation of budget system levels 
- Mid-term financial planning 
- Target and results-oriented budgeting 
- Increasing autonomy and enhancing 
accountability of public sector organizations  
- Reports on financial condition of public 
entities, based on accrual accounting  
Targets: 
- Three-year program based performance-
oriented budgets 
- Accounting and reporting according to 
international standards 
- Internal control and audit  
- Effective and efficient public sector with 
enhanced quality of public services 
After 2008 2007 Budget Code;  
2010 Budget Code; 
2012 Budget Code; 
2013 Budget Code 
with further editions 
and supplements; 
Federal Law “On 
strategic planning in 
the Russian 
Federation” 
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Table 1. The Evidence of Various Discourses in the Content of Central Government Budgeting Norms 
(based on Hyndman et al., 2014) 
Dimension 
/discourse 
PA logic NPM logic NPG logic NWS
1
 logic 
Code words Citizen 
Cash 
Commitments 
Expenditure 
Procedures 
Function 
Efficiency 
Effectiveness 
Output 
Outcome 
Accruals 
Market 
Partnership 
Transparency 
Consolidation 
Consultation 
Modernization 
 
 
Primary 
features 
Cash accounting 
and reporting 
Budgetary 
accounting 
Appeals to the 
rule of law 
Move towards 
accrual accounting 
Performance 
measurement and 
performance 
management 
Audit control 
Consolidated 
budgets 
Participatory 
budgeting 
Stakeholder 
approach 
State as the 
main facilitator 
of complex 
problems 
Law on strategic 
planning 
 
                                                            
1
 The NWS discourse was not presented in the initial framework, suggested by Hyndman et al. (2014) and was 
added based on Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) 
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